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Abstract—Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is a new
concept where virtualization is used to shift “network functions”
(e.g., routers, switches, load-balancers, proxies) from specialized
hardware appliances to software images running on high volume
servers. The resource allocation problem in the NFV environment
has received considerable attention in the past years. However,
little attention was paid to the security aspects of the problem in
spite of the increasing number of vulnerabilities faced by cloud-
based applications. Securing the services is an urgent need to
completely benefit from the advantages offered by NFV. In this
paper, we show how a network service request, composed of
a set of service function chains (SFC) should be modified and
enriched to take into consideration the security requirements of
the supported service. We examine the well-known security best
practices and propose a two-step algorithm that extends the initial
SFC requests to a more complex chaining model that includes
the security requirements of the service.
Index Terms—Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Service
Function chaining (SFC), resource allocation, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network Function Virtualization [1] has drawn significant
attention from both industry and academia as a new concept
allowing greater network flexibility and time/cost reduction
to introduce new services. Network functions, such as load
balancers, WAN optimizers, or Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs), were traditionally provided by dedicated and special-
purpose hardware for each network function. However, this
calls for specialized maintenance and limits flexibility. The
NFV takes advantage of recent advances in virtualisation
technologies to decouple network functions from dedicated
hardware and run them as software in virtual machines or
containers in a cloud computing infrastructure. In this way,
the Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs) can be relocated
and instantiated at different locations without requiring the
purchase and installation of new hardware. Moreover, precise
and dynamic routing of the traffic between the VNFs can
be achieved using the Software-Defined Networks (SDN) [2]
technology.
To fully enjoy the benefits of NFV, security, privacy and
resilience should be guaranteed to the services running over
the VNFs chain. In fact, NFV faces several security challenges
(e.g., multi-tenancy and live migration) that make it vulnerable
to some cybersecurity attacks (e.g., side-channel attacks and
shared resource misuse attacks). Although the resource allo-
cation problem was extensively investigated in the literature
[3]–[5], little attention was paid to the security aspects. In
this paper, we investigate the problem of designing a service
network request, that takes into account the security require-
ments. Starting from initial SFCs containing basic VNFs of
the supported service, we enrich and extend the SFCs to
more complex chaining model that include security needs. We
achieve this in two steps. First, we take profit of the flexibility
allowed by the NFV and SDN paradigms to include addi-
tional customized virtual network security functions (VNSFs).
VNSFs can be firewalls, intrusion detection systems, parental
control systems, among others, and will provide the required
security services depending on the service definition. Second,
we add new security constraints reflecting the resource sharing
and mapping restrictions to guarantee their compliance with
the well-known security best practices.
Note that this is a study of a fundamental nature that tries
take care of critical details of NFV , and it is a necessary
formalization step in order to finally design algorithms that
compute the mapping of the VNF request.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II gives an introduction to the NFV resource allocation
problem, section III details the designed model, section IV
exposes a use-case study, section V describes the related work
and section VI concludes the paper.
II. NFV RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
The application of NFV introduces the problem of efficient
resource management. In fact, the physical resources used to
host the VNFs have a finite amount of compute, memory and
storage capacity. Physical links connecting these resources
have also limited amount of bandwidth. Therefore, these
physical resources should be managed conveniently to gain
the economical benefits promised by NFV.
The resource management problem in NFV is often referred
to as the Service Function Chaining problem and is extensively
investigated in the literature [4], [6] as well as by different
working groups and research projects. Particularly, ETSI NFV
ISG [7] describes a network service request by means of three
graphs, depicted in Figure 1:
Fig. 1. Network Function Virtualization graphs
• The Virtual Network Function Service Graph (VNF-
SG) that represents VNF forwarding graphs (VNF-FGs)
also called service function chains (SFCs) on top of the
network connectivity topology.
• The Network Connectivity Topology (NCT) defining
the underlying network necessary to support the forward-
ing graph flows.
• The NFV infrastructure (NFVI), or substrate network
that will host the requested resources. It is composed
of substrate nodes and links having limited available
resources.
A service request, for example a slice request in a 5G
environment, can be described by a set of service function
chains interacting together to provide the requested service.
The top of Figure 1 shows an example of a service request
composed of two service function chains SFC1 and SFC2.
Each SFC is a collection of VNFs and virtual links connecting
them in a specific order. For instance, SFC1 is composed of
a Firewall, an Intrusion Detection System and a Proxy. Each
SFC requires an amount of bandwidth and each VNF of the
chain has a type (firewall, IDS, etc.) and demands an amount
of computing resources (CPU, memory, storage) to process
the traversing traffic.
The resource provisioning problem in a NFV environment
can be achieved in two stages [4]:
1) VNF service graph composition
2) VNF service graph embedding.
During the first stage, we associate to the service request
a VNF service graph that concatenates the different VNFs
efficiently in order to compose the supported service in the
most adequate way.
Figure 2 shows an illustration of three VNF-SGs that can
be associated to the service request S. In fact, the two SFCs
composing the service require VNFs of the same type (firewall,
proxy). Thus, for efficient resource usage, the service provider
can decide to mutualize some or all these VNFs between the
two chains. Obviously, enough resources should be allocated to
the shared VNFs to process the flows of the different chains.
We remark that for a single service request, diverse VNF-
SGs can be derived depending on how much VNFs are shared
between the services, on their order, etc. Actually, optimizing
the composition of the VNF-SG to achieve some pre-defined
goals (such as resource usage efficiency), while respecting the
services needs, is a challenging problem that requires more
attention from the research community as evoked in [4].
Once the VNF-SG is selected, the VNF-SG embedding
consists in mapping the VNF-SG components (VNFs and
links) into the provider’s infrastructure. This involves two sub-
problems: i) VNFs mapping and ii) virtual links mapping, also
called chaining. VNF mapping consists in finding the best
service nodes in the NFVI having enough resources to host the
VNFs and chaining is about creating optimal paths to chain
the VNFs and steer traffic between them. The mapping cost is
the amount of physical resources required to host the service.
Securing the hosted services is essential to face the in-
creasing and various threats introduced by the VNF envi-
ronment. Conceiving a security-aware service request, from
the beginning, leads to better resource allocation solutions
as it gives richer and more complete information about the
service resource needs. Otherwise, ignoring the service se-
curity constraints can lead to service disruption if network
configurations are required to meet the security needs later. For
these reasons, we introduce a preliminary step that must be
performed before the resource provisioning stages described
above, and consists in enriching the initial service request
to take into consideration its security needs. Note that the
resource provisioning stages are out of the scope of this
paper and will be addressed in future work. We focus on the
preliminary step described above, more detail are given in the
following.
III. DESIGN OF A SECURITY-AWARE SERVICE REQUEST
The problem we tackle is how to enrich an initial service
request to take into account the security needs. To do so, we
will first describe a basic service request model and then detail
the different steps leading to a security-aware service request
model. Next, the impact of these steps over the resource
provisioning stages is examined. But before all this, we will
define the VNF Infrastructure model.
A. The VNFI model
Without loss of generality, we model the VNFI by a
weighted undirected graph Gs = (Ns, Ls), where Ns is the
set of substrate nodes ns and Ls is the set of substrate
links ls. Let c(ns) denote the available capacity of node ns
(typically CPU, storage and memory) and bw(ls) the available
bandwidth on link ls. Variable ϕ represents a substrate path (a
single or a sequence of substrate links) between two substrate
nodes. Variable Pϕ is the set of loop-free substrate paths. The
available bandwidth bw(ϕ) associated to a substrate path ϕ
can be evaluated as the smallest available bandwidth on the
links along the substrate path.
B. Basic Service Request Model
A network service request r can be composed by a set of
service function chains Reqr =
{
SFC1r , SFC
2
r , ...SFC
m
r
}
.
Each service function SFCjr requires an amount of bandwidth
bw(SFCjr ) and describes the ordered VNF sequence the traffic
must traverse, between two endpoints (e.g., a users computer
and a remote server).
SFCjr =
{
f j1 , f
j
2 , ..., f
j
y
}
(1)
Each VNF f requires an amount of resources c(f) to process
the entering traffic. Moreover, as specified by the SFC IETF
working group [8], each VNF f is associated to a type t(f),
e.g., firewall, DPI, NAT, etc. To model the endpoints of the
traffic, we add fictive VNFs f j0 and f
j
∞ at the start and the
end of each service function chain SFCjr . These VNFs are
only defined by their their hosting substrate nodes in the VNF
infrastructure that are selected with respect to the placement
of the endpoints of the SFC. More formally:
SFCjr =
{
f j0 , f
j
1 , f
j
2 , ..., f
j
y , f
j
∞
}
(2)
C. Securing the Service Request
The SFCs will carry user traffic and user specific informa-
tion. This data will contain sensitive information about the user
and the environment in which he is situated. This will require
proper considerations in the design and implementation of the
SFCs to preserve the privacy of the user and the integrity
of the provided data. To do so, we design a security-aware
network service request model that integrates most of the
security measures to be taken into account during the creation
and implementation of the request, as described below.
The universal way to secure a service is to route the traffic to
appropriate security functions to process security operations.
This could be useful to detect intrusion, to classify the traffic,
to monitor the flows, etc. However, this solution can not satisfy
some other security requirements. For example, deploying the
VNFs in untrusted domains is not permitted for services with
high sensitivity. Thus, security mapping constraints should
also be considered. Moreover, resource sharing policy should
be respected during the SFC composition phase. Hence, we
construct the security-aware network request model in two
steps. First we add the required Virtual network security
functions to the initial SFCs and second we define constraints
related to the resource sharing policies and the security
mapping restrictions. These two steps are described below.
1) Step 1: adding virtual network security functions: In
order to secure the services, some additional VNSFs should be
included to the service function chains. The traffic should tra-
verse these VNSFs where security and monitoring operations
will be performed (filtering, inspection, classification, etc.).
Note that deciding which VNSFs to instantiate and where they
should be placed in the service function chain is specific to the
service and it is generally resolved by security experts after
studying the possible threats and vulnerabilities. Inspired by
the literature and standards [7], [9], [10], we define three ways
Fig. 2. Three fashions of inserting a VNSF in the SFC
of adding the VNSFs to the SFC, depending on whether the
whole traffic is routed, split or mirrored (cf. Figure 2):
• traffic routing: this is the case where all traffic is routed
to pass through a VNSF before reaching the next VNF.
• traffic splitting : this is used if the traffic should be split
into different types of flows, each has to traverse different
security chains or bypass some of them. For example,
some unencrypted traffic needs to be inspected by an IDS.
• traffic mirroring : mirroring can be required to deploy
VNSF or security monitoring functions in an out-of-band
fashion, where the traffic does not need to be routed to a
VNSF but simply mirrored. For example, an IDS needs
to analyze a copy of the traffic without acting on it.
Obviously, for each VNSF added to the SFC, the amount
of required resources and the amount of bandwidth necessary
to route the flow to and from the function are specified.
After inserting the VNSFs to a SFC, the result is not a
simple linear chain of VNFs anymore, but a more complex
graph, as shown in Figure 2. Let GSFCjr =
{
NSFCjr , LSFCjr
}
be a weighted oriented graph describing the resulting graph.
NSFCjr represents the set of virtual network functions. LSFCjr
is the set of links supporting the various flows passing through
the VNFs. Note that NSFCjr includes the set of VNFs initially
present in SFCjr in addition to the VNSFs that have been
inserted for security purpose. Formally:
NSFCjr =
{
f jk |f jk ∈ SFCjr
}
⊕ {sf} (3)
{sf} is the set of added VNSFs and ⊕ is an operator inserting
them in the existing sequence of VNFs in the requested SFC, |
means “except”. Note that each virtual link l = (f, f ′) between
two VNFs f and f ′ is associated to a required bandwidth
bw(l). Each VNF f is associated to a type t(f) and required
resources c(f). The service network request is composed of
the set of resulting graphs:
Reqr =
{
GSFC1r , GSFC2r , ...GSFCmr
}
(4)
2) Step 2: defining security deployment constraints:
Along with inserting VNSFs, some security constraints need to
Fig. 3. Two scenarios for resource sharing policy
be considered during the VNF-SG composition and the VNF-
SG embedding stages. In fact, taking into account only the
resource requirements and types during the request creation
is not adequate. Actually, several VNF-SG composition and
VNF-SG embedding options may be valid from an optimiza-
tion point of view but invalid from security best practices and
recommendations point of view as they can break tenants’
security needs. In the rest of the paper, we will use the word
VNF to design both VNFs and VNSFs.
In the following, we describe some constraints that can
model common security requirements and best practices.
Mostly, we define two types of constraints: i) those specifying
the resource sharing policy, and ii) constraints related to
geographical restrictions when deploying the requested com-
ponents in the network infrastructure. Details and motivation
are described below.
• Resources sharing constraints: the resource sharing pol-
icy should be defined for two generic scenarios (cf Fig
3). First, when multiple instances of the same VNF type
can be used to process traffic flows of different SFCs.
Second, when the same physical host (node or link) can
be shared between different VNFs or virtual links.
– Sharing instances
Motivation: for a single VNF, one or more subsequent
VNF instances can be created. For resource usage
efficiency, the service provider can allocate only one
VNF and create two instances in the same host to
proceed two traffic flows of two different services
requiring the same VNF type, as depicted in Figure 3.a.
For example, an anti-virus function can be configured
once and used for every chain that needs this function.
In this case, the workload should be separated in an
appropriate way between the different instances to
achieve service isolation. Because of potential security
breaches, service tenants may refuse sharing instances
of the same VNF.
Design: To formulate this constraint, we specify
for each VNF f the set of VNFs of the other
chains that should not share instances with it, called
DontShareInstances(f).
– Sharing physical resources
Motivation: this deals with allowing or not the co-
location of VNFs (resp. virtual links) in the same phys-
ical node (resp. physical link) as depicted in Figure 3.b.
The co-location can be required to improve the security
service performance or to avoid information leakage.
For example, a firewall and an IDS are placed in the
same node to collaborate and detect malicious activities
within a short time. In another scenario, two security
functions of the same service need to be placed in the
same node to avoid security breaches. However, the co-
location of VNFs and links of different services may be
forbidden to guarantee isolation between the services.
Design: As explained above, the co-location of virtual
components can be required or forbidden, elsewhere
it is simply allowed. To capture these features, we
define for each VNF f , two sets ShouldColoc(f)
(resp. ForbidColoc(f)) defining the list of VNFs that
should (resp. should not) be allocated in the same host
as f . We extend this constraint to the virtual links
connecting the VNFs by specifying for each virtual
link l = (f, f ′) between two VNFs f and f ′ if it
is allowed to share the physical path hosting another
virtual link. ShouldColoc(l) (resp. ForbidColoc(l))
is the list of virtual links that should (resp. should not)
share the same physical path as l.
Obviously, a VNF that should be colocated with f
should not be in the set ForbidColoc(f) and vice
versa, the same condition is valid for virtual links,
formally:
ShouldColoc(f) ∩ ForbidColoc(f) = ∅ (5)
ShouldColoc(l) ∩ ForbidColoc(l) = ∅ (6)
Note that the set of virtual nodes that are neither
in ShouldColoc(f) nor ForbidColoc(f) are simply
allowed to be co-located with f , the same property is
observed for virtual links.
• Geographical/domain related constraints:
Motivation: Different arguments can motivate the need
for taking the geographical and domain constraints into
consideration during the VNF placement. First, the Net-
work Function Virtualization concept is designed to sup-
port the multi-provider scenario and this can introduce
new security vulnerabilities. Particularly, VNFI will be
partitioned into domains of different security levels de-
pending on the trust towards each provider. In fact, if a
VNF is hosted in an insecure physical node, it could be
attacked and this can damage the quality of the offered
service. Similarly, if the traffic is routed over an insecure
physical path, replay and man-in-the-middle attacks could
be performed. Thus, the service network providers can
limit the subset of physical resources that may host their
service to avoid vulnerable and untrusted hosts/domains.
Second, the geographical and domain constraints can be
used to improve the performance of the virtual security
functions by placing them at a certain distance from a
TABLE I
SECURING A SERVICE REQUEST: STEPS AND NOTATIONS
Input: Basic service request & VNF Infrastructure description
Notation Description
Reqr =
{
SFC1r , SFC
2
r , ...SFC
m
r
}
Basic service request
SFCjr =
{
fj0 , f
j
1 , f
j
2 , ..., f
j
y , f
j∞
}
Service function chain j of request r
fji Virtual network function i of SFC
j
r
bw(SFCjr ) Bandwidth required by SFC
j
r
t(f) Type of VNF f
c(f) Resources required by VNF f
fj0 and f
j∞ Endpoints of SFC SFCjr
Gs = (Ns, Ls) VNF infrastructure
Ns Set of substrate nodes
Ls Set of substrate links
Step 1: For each SFC of the request, insert the required VNSFs by routing, splitting or mirroring the traffic
Notation Description
VNSF A virtual network security function
G
SFC
j
r
=
{
N
SFC
j
r
, L
SFC
j
r
}
Graph resulting from the SFCjr after inserting the required VNSFs
N
SFC
j
r
virtual network functions of G
SFC
j
r
L
SFC
j
r
Virtual links of G
SFC
j
r
l = (f, f ′) Virtual link connecting f and f ′
bw(l) Bandwidth required by link l
Step 2: For each virtual component, specify the following security deployment constraints:
Notation Description
DontShareInstances(f) VNFs that should not share instances with VNF f
ShouldColoc(f) resp. ShouldColoc(l) VNFs resp. virtual link that should be allocated in the same substrate node resp. path as f resp. as l
ForbidColoc(f) resp. ForbidColoc(l) VNFs resp. v. link that should NOT be allocated in the same substrate node resp. path as f resp. as l
MayHost(f) resp. MayHost(l) Physical nodes resp. physical links authorized to host the VNF f resp v. link l
Output: Security-aware service request
Notation Description
Reqr =
{
GSFC1r
, GSFC2r
, ...GSFCmr
}
Security-aware service request
reference point where detection, network analysis and
responding would be more efficient. For example, de-
tecting DDoS attack would be easier if performed close
to the sources. Similarly, placing firewalls and IDS/IPS
close to the border of the Telecommunication Service
Provider domain is better to block unwanted traffic before
it enters the network. Moreover traffic encryption should
be performed before traversing the untrusted network for
end-to-end security.
Design: To formulate these constraints, we define for
each virtual resource, the set of physical resources al-
lowed to host it. Then MayHost(f) ⊂ Ns is the set
of physical nodes authorized to host the VNF f , and
MayHost(l) ⊂ Ls is the set of physical links where
the virtual link l = (f, f ′) can be mapped. MayHost(f)
and MayHost(l) should be constructed in a way that the
insecure domains are avoided, and the VNFs performance
is increased. In a finer-grained description, let d(ns,ms)
denote the distance between two substrate nodes ns and
ms, e.g., the number of hops or the geographical distance.
Let p ∈ Ns be a substrate node defining a reference point.
If the VNF f should be placed at a certain distance δ
from the reference place p, then MayHost(f) may be
deduced as follows:
MayHost(f) = {ms ∈ Ns|d(ns,ms) < δ} (7)
D. Security-aware Service Request
In conclusion, a security-aware service request Reqr
can be described by a set of secure SFCs Reqr ={
GSFC1r , GSFC2r , ...GSFCmr
}
. For each GSFCjr ∈ Reqr, each
VNF f jk ∈ NSFCjr (except f
j
0 and f
j
∞) is associated to
i) a type t(f jk), ii) a requested capacity c(f
j
k) and a set of
security deployment constraints, namely, iii) MayHost(f jk),
the list of physical nodes where f jk can be allocated,
iv) ShouldColoc(f jk) resp. v) ForbidColoc(f
j
k), the set of
other VNFs that should resp. should not be co-located with f jk .
vi) DontShareInstances(f jk), the set of VNFs that should
not share instances with it.
For each virtual link l = (f jk , f
j
k′) connecting two VNFs
f jk and f
j
k′ , we associate i) a requested bandwidth bw(l)
ii) MayHost(l), the list of physical links allowed to host
l, iii) ShouldColoc(l) resp. iv) ForbidColoc(l), the lists of
virtual links that should resp. should not be co-located with l.
The different steps and notation of the model are summa-
rized in Table I. In the following, we will examine the impact
of the proposed model over the two resource provisioning
stages described in Section II; the service graph composition
and embedding.
E. Service Graph Composition
From the slice request, and during the service graph com-
position step (cf. Section II), an optimal VNF service graph is
derived with respect to the resource sharing constraints. This
graph contains the routing and forwarding description of the
set of SFCs and shows how the functions can be interconnected
at a virtual level.
Let SGr = (Nr, Lr) be a directed weighted graph rep-
resenting the VNF service graph associated to the service
request Reqr. Lr is the set of links supporting the various
flows passing through the VNFs. The set of nodes nr ∈ Nr
represents the set of virtual network functions that will be used
to support the different SFCs.
During the service graph composition step, two or more
VNFs (resp. virtual links connecting two VNFs) can be
consolidated into one virtual node (resp. one virtual link) of
the VNF service graph to optimize the resource usage and
simplify the service graph. We call this, virtual nodes resp.
virtual links composition. The different security constraints
associated to the service request should be respected and kept
to preserve the service integrity. In the following, we show
how the security parameters associated to the virtual elements
(nodes and links) of the service graph should be calculated
during the composition step.
1) Virtual nodes composition: Let nr ∈ Nr be a virtual
node of the service graph SGr and let Share(nr) be the set
of virtual network functions merged into nr.
Two VNFs f and f ′ can be in the set Share(nr) if and
only if :
• f and f ′ have the same type.
• f and f ′ accept to share instances:
f /∈ DontShareInstances(f ′) &
f ′ /∈ DontShareInstances(f) (8)
• f and f ′ accept to share the same substrate host:
f /∈ ForbidColoc(f ′) & f ′ /∈ ForbidColoc(f) (9)
• f and f ′ do not have conflicting constraints:
– A VNF that should be co-located with f , should not
be banned from the co-location with f ′ and vice versa:
ForbidColoc(f ′) ∩ ShouldColoc(f) = Ø &
ForbidColoc(f) ∩ ShouldColoc(f ′) = Ø (10)
– At least one substrate node is allowed to host both f
and f ′:
MayHost(f) ∩MayHost(f ′) 6= Ø (11)
Consequently, the constraints associated to the resulting virtual
node nr can be deduced as follows:
• nr has the type of the grouped VNFs, thus:
t(nr) = t(f),∀f ∈ Share(nr) (12)
• The requested capacity is the sum of all the required
resources by the grouped VNFs:
c(nr) =
∑
f∈Share(nr)
c(f) (13)
• Only substrate nodes allowed to host all the grouped
VNFs may host nr, thus:
MayHost(nr) =
⋂
f∈Share(nr)
MayHost(f) (14)
• Consider all the VNFs that should be co-colocated:
ShouldColoc(nr) =
⋃
f∈Share(nr)
ShouldColoc(f)
(15)
• Consider all the VNFs that are prohibited from being co-
located:
ForbidColoc(nr) =
⋃
f∈Share(nr)
ForbidColoc(f) (16)
In this way, ShouldColoc(nr) and ForbidColoc(nr) verify
the properties (5) and (6). Finally, DontShareInstances is
obvsiouly not defined for nr, as it is not required during the
embedding step.
2) Virtual links composition: To simplify the service graph
and the embedding step, two or more virtual links l and l′ can
be consolidated into one virtual link lr of the service graph.
The conditions that should be respected when merging virtual
links and the security parameters associated to the resulting
virtual link are calculated in the same fashion as for virtual
nodes composition. Details are not given due to lack of space.
F. Service Graph Embedding
Once the service graph is deduced, resources should be
allocated and instantiated to support the service. The re-
source allocation problem in the NFV environment is well
investigated [4] but little attention was paid to the security
constraints. Below we give a simplified formulation of the
embedding problem while considering the security constraints:
1) Objective: Given a substrate network Gs and a service
graph request Reqr. The aim is to find a mapping of all the
virtual nodes and links of Reqr, to the substrate nodes and
links of Gs so that the required resources are provided and the
physical resources spent to map Reqr, known as embedding
cost, are minimized, under the following constraints:
2) Constraints:
• Basic constraints:
– Resources constraints: ensure that the resources re-
quired by a virtual element do not exceed the avail-
able resources of the substrate element to which it is
mapped
– Flow conservation constraint: during link mapping,
ensure that outbound flow is equal to inbound flow
for each intermediate node in the hosting path.
• Security related constraints: For each virtual ele-
ment, the physical resource sharing and geographi-
cal/domain constraints, defined by the sets MayHost(.),
ShouldColoc(.) and ForbidColoc(.) should be re-
spected.
IV. USE-CASE STUDY
In this section, we show through an example, how to build
a security-aware service request, starting from a basic request.
For clarity’s sake, we will use the same presentation format
as Section III.
A. The VNFI model
As substrate network, we use the Abilene topology from
SNDlib [11], shown in Figure 4. Alibene is a reference for
mid-scale network containing 12 nodes and 15 edges.
Fig. 4. VNF Infrastructure topology
B. Basic Service Request
Based on the Service Function Chaining Use Cases in
Mobile Networks proposed by the IETF standardization group
[12], we consider the scenario of a service request in a 3GPP-
based mobile networks environment and composed of two
service function chains presented in Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows a simplified view of a 3GGP-based service
networks. It includes user equipments (UE) like smartphones
or tablets, the 3GPP mobile network and the packet gateways
(P-GW), followed by Service Function Chains where the
upstream and downstream user flows will pass. The SFCs will
be provided by the NFV Infrastructure, connected to internet
or/and an internal application platform like IMS, through a
router. IETF described different categories of service functions
that can be used in the 3GPP mobile networks scenario. Based
on this description, we consider the SFCs depicted in the
Figure 5. SFC1 includes a Video Optimizer (Video Opt.) to
improve the users Quality of experience and a firewall (FW) to
protect the carrier network from the outside. SCF 2 includes
a parental control function (Par. Ctrl), to restrict content, and
a firewall. The endpoints of the traffic traversing the SFCs are
the packet gateways that will be mapped to substrate nodes
11 and 8, and the routers that will be mapped to the same
substrate node 9, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Fig. 5. SFCs scenario in 3GPP-based mobile networks
Fig. 6. SFCs after adding VSNFs
Using the basic service request model proposed in Section
III-B, the previous service network request description is
detailed in Table II, where the bandwidth and virtual node
functions resource requirements are specified.
TABLE II
BASIC SERVICE REQUEST
Req =
{
SFC1, SFC2
}
bw(SFC1) = 10 bw(SFC2)=20
SFC1 =
{
f10 , f
1
1 , f
1
2 , f
1∞
}
SFC2 =
{
f20 , f
2
1 , f
2
2 , f
2∞
}
t(f11 )=Video.Opt t(f
1
2 )=FW t(f
2
1 )=Par.Ctrl. t(f
2
2 )=FW
c(f11 ) = 25 c(f
1
2 ) = 10 c(f
2
1 ) = 20 c(f
2
2 ) = 10
f10 = P-GW, mapped to node 11 f
2
0 = P-GW, mapped to node 8
f1∞= Router, mapped to node 9 f2∞= Router, mapped to node 9
C. Securing the Service Request
As described in Section III-C, we construct the security-
aware network service request model in two steps, detailed
below.
1) Step 1: adding virtual network security functions:
First we add the required Virtual network security functions
to the initial SFCs. In our example, imagine that an Intrusion
Detection System needs to be added to SFC1 in order to
detect malicious activity or policy violations. As this VNSF
is computationally demanding, it may cause a noticeable
performance degradation to latency-sensitive applications like
video streaming. So let us insert two load balancers to split
video stream away from the other traffic and act on each
type separately. In conclusion, we add three VNSF to SFC1,
by traffic routing (the two load balancers) and by traffic
splitting (IDS). We also add a monitoring VNSF (MN) to
SFC2 by traffic mirroring.
The resulting graphs are represented in Figure 6, where the
numbers in a rectangle, next to the arrows are the requested
bandwidth. Other details describing the service network re-
quest, namely the required resources of the newly added
VNFs, are detailed in the upper part of Table III, following
the service request model proposed in Section III-C1.
TABLE III
SECURITY-AWARE SERVICE REQUEST
Req = {GSFC1 , GSFC2}
NSFC1 =
{
f10 , f
1
1 , f
1
2 , f
1
3 , f
1
4 , f
1
5 , f
1∞
}
NSFC2 =
{
f20 , f
2
1 , f
2
2 , f
2
3 , f
2∞
}
LSFC1 =
{
(f10 , f
1
1 ), (f
1
1 , f
1
2 ), (f
1
2 , f
1
3 ), (f
1
3 , f
1
4 ), (f
1
4 , f
1∞)(f11 , f
1
5 ), (f
1
5 , f
1
2 )
}
LSFC1 =
{
(f10 , f
1
1 ), (f
1
1 , f
1
2 ), (f
1
2 , f
1
3 ), (f
1
3 , f
1
4 )
}
bw((f10 , f
1
3 )) = bw((f
1
4 , f
1
2 )) = bw((f
1
2 , f
1∞)) = 10
bw((f10 , f
1
1 )) = bw((f
1
3 , f
1
4 )) = bw((f
1
3 , f
1
4 )) =
bw((f14 , f
1∞)) = 20
bw((f13 , f
1
1 )) = bw((f
1
1 , f
1
4 )) = bw((f
1
3 , f
1
5 )) = bw((f
5
2 , f
1
4 )) = 5
t(f13 )=LB t(f
1
1 )=Video Opt. t(f
1
4 )=LB t(f
1
2 )=FW t(f
1
5 )=IDS t(f
2
1 )=Par.Ctrl. t(f
2
2 )=FW t(f
2
3 )=MN
c(f13 ) = 25 c(f
1
1 ) = 25 c(f
1
4 ) = 10 c(f
1
2 ) = 10 c(f
1
5 ) = 20 c(f
2
1 ) = 20 c(f
2
2 ) = 10 c(f
2
3 ) = 20
f10 = P-GW, mapped to node 11 f
2
0 = P-GW, mapped to node 8
f1∞= Router, mapped to node 11 f2∞= Router, mapped to node 8
DontShareInstances(f13 ) =
{
f14
}
, DontShareInstances(f14 ) ={
f13
}
, DontShareInstances(f11 ) = DontShareInstances(f
1
2 ) =
DontShareInstances(f15 ) = {ø}
DontShareInstances(f21 ) = DontShareInstances(f
2
2 ) =
DontShareInstances(f23 ) = {ø}
ForbidColoc(f13 ) =
{
f14
}
, ForbidColoc(f14 ) =
{
f13
}
, ForbidColoc(f11 ) =
ForbidColoc(f12 ) = ForbidColoc(f
1
5 ) = {ø}
ForbidColoc(f21 ) = ForbidColoc(f
2
2 ) =
ForbidColoc(f23 ) = {ø}
ShouldColoc(f12 ) =
{
f15
}
, ShouldColoc(f15 ) =
{
f12
}
, ShouldColoc(f13 ) =
ShouldColoc(f11 ) = ShouldColoc(f
1
4 ) = {ø}
ShouldColoc(f21 ) = ShouldColoc(f
2
2 ) =
ShouldColoc(f23 ) = {ø}
MayHost(f11 ) = MayHost(f
1
2 ) = MayHost(f
1
3 ) = MayHost(f
1
4 ) =
MayHost(f15 ) = Ns \ {4, 7}
MayHost(f23 ) = {1}, MayHost(f21 ) = MayHost(f22 ) =
Ns \ {4, 7}
MayHost((f10 , f
1
3 )) = MayHost((f
1
3 , f
1
1 )) = MayHost((f
1
1 , f
1
4 )) =
MayHost((f14 , f
1
2 )) = MayHost((f
1
2 , f
1∞)) = MayHost((f13 , f
1
5 )) =
MayHost((f15 , f
1
4 )) = Ls \ {(4, 7)}
MayHost((f20 , f
2
1 )) = MayHost((f
2
1 , f
2
1 )) =
MayHost((f22 , f
2∞)) = MayHost((f21 , f
2
3 )) = Ls \{(4, 7)}
2) Step 2: defining security deployment constraints:
We specify the set of constraints related to the resource
sharing policies and the security mapping restrictions for
each virtual component of the request. An illustration is
given in the lower part of Table III. For instance, the
firewall and an IDS of SFC1 should be placed in the
same substrate node to collaborate and detect malicious
activities rapidly, thus, ShouldColoc(f15 ) =
{
f12
}
and
ShouldColoc(f12 ) =
{
f15
}
. Moreover, let us imagine that
only the substrate node 1 can provide the monitoring
function, so MN of SFC2 should be mapped to substrate
node 1, thus MayHost(f23 ) = {1}. Next, let the two
load balancers be de-localized and prohibited from sharing
instances. Consequently, DontShareInstances(f13 )={
f14
}
, DontShareInstances(f14 ) =
{
f13
}
, and
ForbidColoc(f13 ) =
{
f14
}
and ForbidColoc(f14 ) =
{
f13
}
.
Finally, as depicted in figure 4, the substrate nodes 4 and
7 of the VNFI, and the substrate link connecting them are
considered to be a dangerous area with security breaches, thus
they should be avoided during the mapping. Therefore, they
are excluded from the MayHost(.) set of all the requested
virtual components.
D. Security-aware Service Request
Table III illustrates the security-aware request resulting from
applying the previous steps on the basic request shown in Table
II. The comparison between the Tables III and II shows that
the security-aware request is richer and more complex.
E. Service Graph Composition and Embedding
Conceiving algorithms to resolve the Service graph com-
position and embedding problems described in sections III-E
and III-F is out of the scope of this paper. Existing algorithms
in the NFV resource allocation literature should be adapted
and enhanced to resolve these problems because of the com-
plexity added when considering the security constraints. This
complexity can lead to slower computation times, lower query
acceptance rates, and higher embedding costs. Figure 7 shows
a possible solution of the service graph composition where the
firewalls of the two SFCs are merged to utilize two instances of
the same image for efficient resource usage. Compared to the
initial service request shown in Figure 5, composed of simple
linear chains, we can see that the resulting graph topology is
more complex.
Fig. 7. A possible result of service graph composition
V. RELATED WORK
The resource allocation problem in NFV has already at-
tracted the attention of the research community. But most of
the existing work focused on the service function chaining
problem, referred to as the VNF service graph embedding in
this paper. Only a few papers investigated the security aspects
of the problem.
Namely, the authors of [13] tackled the problem of efficient
Security Service Chain (SSC) deployment. A SSC is an ordered
set of security functions composing a logical security service.
The authors proposed heuristic algorithms to select hosting
nodes and establish routing paths. The proposal avoids VNFI
resource fragmentation and security service latency. The au-
thors of [14], [15] proposed an Integer Linear Programming
(ILP) formulation for placing VNSFs with respect to both the
quality of service requirements and the security constraints.
They argue that omitting the QoS requirements by forcing
all the traffic to traverse the whole VNSFs chain can cause
performance degradation to latency-sensitive applications, es-
pecially when traversing computationally-demanding security
functions such as IDS. The authors of [16] proposed a three-
stage model to solve the VNSFs mapping problem: first,
the requested security policies are translated into chained
VNSFs; second, the security SFC mapping is formulated as a
mixed ILP problem; inally, the MILP problem is solved. The
authors of [17] formulated the problem of optimal placement
of ordered sequences of security middle-boxes as a traveling
purchaser problem. In [18], the same authors designed a
scalable algorithm to solve the mapping problem. The solution
is based on a multistage approach to cope with the complexity
of the problem. Later, in [19], the authors enhanced their work
by defining network security defense patterns (NSDP) that
capture best security practices and efficiently select deploy-
ment options for security functions. The authors of [20] used
a modified version of the Best-Fit Decreasing (BFD) algorithm
to solve the problem of allocating VNSFs in cloud data centers.
In [21], the authors focused on searching optimal placement
for VNSFs. The best hosts are the most capable to control the
traffic. This is measured by the node centrality that represents
the degree of connectivity between nodes.
Existing work tackled the problem of securing a network
service request as a resource provisioning problem where
the proposals attempt to find an optimal mapping of VNSFs
chains. Unlike them, our proposal is a preliminary step where
the initial service request is extended to express its security
needs before its embedding.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on the security aspects of service request
in an NFV environment. It tackles the problem of conceiving a
security-aware service request. We propose a two-step model
that enriches a basic query description to take into consid-
eration the eventual security needs of the request. The model
incorporates well thought-out security parameters to meet most
known security needs and recommended best practices. The
resulting security-aware request is richer and more complex.
Future works include the design of adequate service graph
composition and embedding algorithms, which are required to
resolve a problem with such complexity.
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